Is there a duty to warn of an obviously dangerous product?

““A duty to warn arises where a product is inherently dangerous or has dangerous propensities…. However, there is no duty to warn of an obvious danger.” *545 Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. v. Medina, 719 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review denied, 733 So.2d 516 (Fla.1999)(quoting Cohen v. General Motors Corp., Cadillac Div., 427 So.2d 389, 390–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see also Perez v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 431 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA)(“[the] duty [to warn] extends only to those dangers which are not obvious”)(citing Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)), review denied, 440 So.2d 352 (Fla.1983). Further, there is no duty to warn the plaintiff of a danger that he is aware of. See Wickham v. Baltimore Copper Paint Co., 327 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding that adequacy of the warning on the label was not a material issue where the plaintiff and his employer knew of and read the warning label and were cognizant of the dangers involved with using the product), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1173 (Fla.1976).

Because the danger was open and obvious and because Rodriguez was aware of the danger, the trial court correctly concluded that the defendants did not have a duty to warn and properly granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.”